An unresolved problem in Bayesian decision theory is how to value and price information. This paper resolves both problems for inexpensive information. Building on Large Deviation Theory, we produce a generically complete asymptotic order on samples of i.i.d. signals in finite-state, finite-action models. Computing the marginal value of an additional signal, we find it is eventually exponentially falling in quantity, and higher for lower quality signals. We provide a precise formula for the information demand, valid at low prices: asymptotically a constant times the log price, and falling in the signal quality for a given price. * This revision reflects the comments of Nancy Stokey and three referees on our April 2000 version. We have also benefited from the feedback of seminar audiences at Princeton, NYU, and Yale, and specifically thank Jon Levin for detailed early comments, and Ed Schlee for drawing our attention to the work of 
Introduction
An unresolved problem in Bayesian decision theory is how to value and price information.
For instance, Blackwell's Theorem asserts that the value of different informative statistical experiments (signals) is generically incomparable across all decision makers -sufficiency being an extremely partial order.
1 The theory of information demand is also problematic:
Under smoothness assumptions on information and payoff functions, Radner and Stiglitz (1984) argued that the marginal value of information is initially zero. Consequently, the value of information is not globally concave, and first order conditions alone do not describe demand.
2 So for those in the business of buying or selling information, economists have little to say.
This paper attempts to fill this gap, for the case of inexpensive information units.
One economic motivation of this assumption owes to the rise of the Internet. Webbased distribution of information -be it databases, encyclopedias, or news services -has dramatically reduced its marginal cost.
3 While economists have focused on the valuation and pricing of a single informative signal, these technological changes speak to the importance of the large demand special case. Alternatively, the information acquired is 'large' whenever the cost of an extra sample is very small relative to the payoff stakesas with tests of new potentially dangerous devices, like motor vehicles, aircraft, or space vehicles, or in the final phase of clinical trials of new drugs.
Throughout this paper, we interpret the quantity of information as the number of signal draws purchased nonsequentially. 4 With this natural definition, we find that for large samples there exists a generically complete order for statistical experiments with finitely many states and actions. This is true despite Blackwell's restrictive order for each signal draw. And despite the negative message of Radner and Stiglitz for small quantities of information, we exhibit a falling demand curve for low enough prices and hence large demands; we then derive its asymptotic formula, that is logarithmic in price.
In statistical decision models, as evidence accumulates the truth gets revealed by the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN), and one eventually makes the right decision. So decision making is about avoiding mistakes, which in turn are deviations from the SLLN.
We take inspiration from Chernoff (1952) 's fundamental connection between simple statistical hypotheses tests and Large Deviation Theory. We refine this logic for Bayesian decision problems characterizing the marginal value of information, and thereby the demand for informative samples; finally, we also extend the theory to the multi-state case.
Specifically, Chernoff employed Cramér's (1938) asymptotic expansion for the chance of a large deviation of a sample mean from its SLLN limit. In a Bayesian world, rational behavior in the two state case depends solely on the total log-likelihood ratio (logLR) of the observed sample -or the sum of i.i.d. random variables. We extend Cramér's result to compute the chance of large deviations of such running sample sums (Lemma 1).
We find that for any (imperfectly) informative signal σ, a unique efficiency index ρ ∈ (0, 1) exists such that the value of perfect information less that of n independent draws from σ behaves as ρ n for large n (Theorem 1). Therefore, when one may sample from a large pool of conditionally independent draws of the signal σ, the scalar 1/ρ measures the value of σ and yields a generically complete order over signals for any decision maker.
We then extend the order on the total value of information to the margin, and thereby demand. We find that the marginal value of the nth independent draw behaves as ρ n , for large n, and so is eventually falling monotonically (Theorem 2). This yields our 'Law of Large Demand' for information (Theorem 3): For all low enough prices p > 0, the demand for information is asymptotically (log p)/ log ρ, and thus falling in the signal quality 1/ρ. In fact, at small prices, we ascertain the information demand within an integer. More specifically, information demand lies within one of [log p + 1 2 log(− log p) + (constant)]/ log ρ, where the constant depends on preferences and the signal.
Our logarithmic demand formula should have many applications; for instance, it yields boundary behavior of the information demand curve in a general equilibrium setting.
While this formula obtains for large demand, we hope that in applied analyses of information provision, a logarithmic form offers some guidance as a benchmark; eg. it invalidates alternative functional forms, such as isoelastic. It also implies that more valuable signals have a lower marginal value schedule, and so are less demanded.
Section 5 provides a key inequality establishing the robustness of our results to finitely many states and actions (Theorem 4). In particular, the inference problem for large samples with many states of nature is dominated by the two states hardest to distinguish; this pair determines the signal's quality measure ρ. A Bayesian decision-maker eventually optimally focuses on a worst-case scenario independently of her beliefs and preferences.
The Model
A Decision Maker (DM) must choose an action a from a finite menu A = {a 1 , . . . , a K }.
The DM has a full support prior probability density q(θ) on state θ ∈ Θ = {θ 1 , . . . , θ M }.
Action a yields the DM vNM utility u(a, θ) in state θ, where u : A × Θ → R. No action is dominated (which is WLOG), and there is a unique best action a * (θ) = arg max a∈A u(a, θ)
in each state θ (as is generically true).
Let E = f (·| θ), θ ∈ Θ be an experiment (sometimes called a signal ). By this, we mean a family of state-dependent probability densities on outcomes in X, each associated to a probability measure µ θ on a measurable space (X, F). So given the true state θ, E can be represented by a random variable X with the density f (·| θ) over outcomes in X.
Each signal outcome is assumed imperfectly informative, f (·| θ) having full support on X.
Before choosing an action, the DM chooses a sample size n, and then observes the outcome of an n-sample X n = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) ∈ X n of experiments E. Observations are assumed to be independent, conditional on the state. 5 After seeing the joint realization X n = x n , the DM then updates her prior beliefs to the posterior Pr(θ|x n , q), and takes the action that maximizes expected utility given the sample, namely a
. The DM's ex ante expected payoff V q,u (n) from sampling n observations is her maximum expected utility, depending on her prior and utility function:
is the joint probability density of the state θ and observations x n .
We suppress the subscripts u or q of the payoff function V , when there is no ambiguity.
As the DM may always ignore observations, V (n) is nondecreasing in the sample size n.
For pedagogical reasons, the paper focuses until Section 5 on the binary-state, binaryaction case with Θ = {L, H} and A = {A, B}, as in a classical test of simple hypotheses.
Absent a dominated action, we assume WLOG that action B is best in state H, so that u(A, L) > u(B, L) and u(B, H) > u(A, H). In this context, denote the belief q = Pr(H), so that V q (0) is a piecewise linear, convex function of q. The DM then optimally chooses action B iff q ≥q, for someq ∈ (0, 1).
Large Deviations and the Value of Information
A. Expected Payoffs via Error Chances. The DM selects A iff his belief falls below a cutoff:
The expected payoff is then Pr(q n <q|L)u(A, L) + Pr(q n ≥q|L)u(B, L) in state L, and Pr(q n ≥q|H)u(B, H) + Pr(q n <q|H)u(A, H) in state H. Let the two error probabilities be α n = Pr(q n ≥q|L) and β n = Pr(q n <q|H). 
for positive constants
Write the posterior belief in log-likelihood form:
The optimality rule q n ≤q is thus the same as
B. Asymptotic Tests. Perhaps the log-LR cannot cross the threshold ξ(q, u) until at
Then a large enough sample size must have positive value, since in state L (say) lim n→∞ S θ n /n = λ θ > 0 (a.s.) by the SLLN. So we eventually a.s. have
The dependence of the error chances α n , β n -and thus the payoff V (n) -on the sample size n reduces not to the Law of Large Numbers, but instead to the theory of Large Deviations for sums of i.i.d.r.v.s., which studies the chance of tail events. Since
To characterize the chances of large deviations, we make some technical assumptions about random variables Y , such as the log-LR
be the moment generating function (MGF) of Y , and Cramér's (1938) asymptotic formula for the chance of a large deviations of a sample mean:
, for every k = 1, 2, . . . , and γ ≡ σ|τ |. This theory, applied to our log-likelihood ratio process Y = θ (X i ), yields a special structure. To see this, define the Hellinger transform of an experiment E:
This is the moment generating function (MGF) of the log-LR of either state L versus H in state H, or vice versa, after change of variables: respectively, M H (t) ≡ H E (−t) and
Cramér's theory suggests considering the minimum of this MGF. Note that when E is informative, namely f (·| H) and f (·| H) differ, such a minimum uniquely exists: Indeed, H E (t) is a strictly convex function on (0, 1) obeying
where τ θ is the minimizer of the MGF of θ , and τ E = τ L + 1 = −τ H ∈ (0, 1). So we can treat ρ E as the unique efficiency index of the experiment, measuring how easy large samples can distinguish f (·|H) and f (·|L). Indeed, ρ E has all the right properties for measuring an experiment's informativeness in large samples. For instance,
7 This requires that all moments of Y be finite; the standard SLLN requires only four finite moments.
for the joint experiment
Chernoff (1952) used lim n→∞ [log Pr(S n /n ≤ κ| θ)]/n = log ρ E for θ = H, L, and any κ < λ θ , to rank asymptotically classical hypothesis tests based on a sample mean. This formula followed from the lead term of Cramér's expansion (3). By contrast, our Bayesian error probabilities α n , β n are chances of large deviations of sample sums. By exploiting the first two terms of (3), we now extend Chernoff's finding to our Bayesian framework.
Then the error chances α n and β n satisfy
C. The Asymptotic Value of Information. Since the Full Information Gap (1) is a weighted average of the error chances α n and β n , each of the form in (4), the gap vanishes as fast as do α n and β n . The next theorem is then immediate, given the following constant:
Theorem 1 Given a DM (q, u) and an experiment E with efficiency index ρ E , the Full Information Gap obeys
Corollary Fix experiments E 1 and E 2 with ρ E 1 < ρ E 2 . For generic (q, u), there exists N < ∞ such that for all n ≥ N , an n-sample from E 1 is strictly preferred to one from E 2 .
In other words, for any finite set of DM's, there exists N < ∞ such that for all larger sample sizes n > N , all DM's agree on the ordering of n-samples from E 1 vs. E 2 . One cannot rank different experiments with the same efficiency index ρ. 8 Viewing minimizing expected losses as maximizing expected utility, the corollary follows from Theorem 3.9
in Torgersen (1981) [T81] (which is weaker than our Lemma 1). Our novel results begin next with the marginal analysis, for which T81's Theorem 3.9 is too weak to build upon.
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The error term in Theorem 1 plays a central role in justifying our asymptotic analysis.
For consider an approximate F IG(n) ≡ cρ n E / √ n, omitting the variable DM-idiosyncratic error terms. Ranking experiments by their approximate F IGs is based only on our efficiency index ρ n E , for any DM. While both the approximate F IG(n) and the true F IG(n) vanish as n explodes, the percentage divergence between the two vanishes too, being O(1/ √ n); thus, F IG(n) and F IG(n) approach each other much faster than either of them approaches zero. This will also hold true for the marginal value of information.
We briefly relate Theorem 1 to a result much more familiar among economists - Blackwell's (1953) Theorem. If E 1 is statistically sufficient for E 2 , then any n-sample from E 1 is sufficient for that from E 2 , and thus ρ E 1 ≤ ρ E 2 , simply because H E 1 (t) ≤ H E 2 (t) at all t (see p. 358 of Torgersen, 1991) . But if E 1 is not sufficient for E 2 , nor conversely, the same is true of their n-replicas, and Blackwell's Theorem has nothing to say. Our Theorem 1 gives a generically complete asymptotic ranking which favors the experiment with the smaller ρ. In Section 5, we show that this is true for any finite number of actions and states. While the conclusion obtains for all priors q and payoffs u, the threshold sample size N depends not only on the signal structure Θ, f like Blackwell's Theorem, but also on the decision problem, namely the belief q and payoffs u. So no finite n-sample of independent signals from E 1 is ever sufficient for an n-sample from E 2 .
D. The Asymptotic Marginal Value of Information. To ascertain not only the DM's value of information but also his demand, we now consider the asymptotic incremental value of the nth signal draw; for this, we introduce the notation ∆g(n) ≡ g(n + 1) − g(n), for any function g(n). We investigate the asymptotic properties of the increment in the chance of a large deviation for a unit increment in the sample size.
Lemma 1 allows us to deduce an asymptotic ordering of the marginal value of information, and thereby an asymptotically falling marginal value of information.
Theorem 2 Fix an experiment E and a DM (q, u). The marginal value of the n-th
sample from E vanishes as does ρ n E / √ n:
Moreover, there exists N < ∞ such that ∆V (n) > ∆V (n + 1) > 0 for all n ≥ N .
Proof: Taking first differences of the value yields
The first claim follows because n n+1 → 1. For the second claim, take second differences:
By the last two equations, for N large enough, ∆V (n) > 0 > ∆ 2 V (n) for all n ≥ N .
So by Theorems 1 and 2, as the quality of information grows, i.e. the efficiency index ρ E falls, the expected value of an n-sample rises, as expected, while less obviously so, the marginal value of the nth observation falls.
For a revealing comparison with the statistical literature, Mammen (1986) studies the behavior of the deficiency of n with respect to n + 1 signal draws -namely, the most one can gain by using n + 1 versus n observations, where the maximum is taken over priors q and payoffs u in [−1, 1] (see Le Cam (1964) ). He finds that this marginal deficiency is of order O(1/n). Loosely, as a "worst-case analysis" across priors and payoffs, the deficiency is rather slowly vanishing. By contrast, Full Information Gaps vanish exponentially fast, since the DM's prior and payoffs do not vary with the sample size n.
The Demand for Information
Suppose that the DM faces a constant price p > 0 for each independent observation of E. Assume that he chooses n to maximize V (n) − pn. His information demand is the number of signals n(p) ∈ {1, 2, . . . } that he buys. With a smooth concave value, demand solves V (n(p)) = p, and so if the marginal value V (n) vanishes exponentially, then demand is logarithmic. Of course, demand is discrete, and perhaps poorly behaved; also our approximate marginal value contains both exponential and geometric factors.
Still, we now prove that this intuitive log demand formula is almost precise, with an extra term owing to the geometric factor, and we very tightly bound the approximation error.
We underscore that, at small prices, our demand formula is exact to the nearest integer.
Theorem 3 Fix an experiment E with efficiency index ρ E . For almost all p, demand n(p)
is single-valued, and decreasing in p. Also, there existsp > 0 such that for all p ∈ (0,p), demand is within 1 of
So for small p: n(p) ∼ (log p)/(log ρ E ); further, n(p) monotonically rises in ρ E , at fixed p.
Proof: In the appendix, we prove that for almost all p, there is a unique demand 10 n(p), with lim p→0 n(p) = ∞. Furthermore, optimality clearly demands that any optimal demand n(p) solves the "discrete FOC"
1. Lead Log Term. Let C 1 ≡ 1/ log ρ E . Take logs of (5) using ∆V (n) from Theorem 2:
where
since n(0) = ∞. Multiply (6) by C 1 < 0, and use (log n)/n vanishing in n (so log n = o p (1)n):
2. Log-Log Term. We have log n(p) = log(− log p)(1+o p (1)), and so also log[n(p)−1] = log([1 + o p (1)]n(p)) = log(− log p)(1 + o p (1)). To quantify δ n(p) , substitute the expressions for n(p), log n(p), and log[n(p) − 1] into (6). If we then subtract n(p) log ρ E = log p, and absorb Q(n), Q(n − 1) ≈ C 2 into log(− log p)(1 + o p (1)):
Similarly absorb 1/C 1 , divide by log p, and use log n(p)/ log p = O((log(− log p))/ log p) = o p (1), to get (6), subtract log p globally, and rearrange terms, using log n(p) − log(
That is, for all ε > 0, there isp ∈ (0,p), so that for all p ∈ (0,p), we have the error
Extension to Multiple Actions and States
We now extend our main results (Theorems 1-3 
So the key properties of Pr(S θ n ≤ 0|θ) carry over to α θ nj , and Theorem 1 holds with the multiplicative constant c modified to c 2K which absorbs factors like (e |τ θ |ξ j+1 − e −|τ θ |ξ j ).
B. Multiple States and Actions. By merging states, assume M > 2 statistically distinguishable states Θ = {θ 1 , . . . , θ M }, with one action dominant in each state (generically true), so K ≥ M . Label actions so that a i is best in θ i : u ii > u ji for j = i, where
Fix E. For states i, j = 1, 2, . . . , M , i = j, define the 'pairwise' efficiency index of E:
suppressing a further E subscript on ρ. Label states so that ρ 12 = max i,j =i ρ ij .
Let V (n) denote the expected value of an n-sample, and V * ≡ Σ i q i u ii the full information value. Let V ij (n) be the value of n observations in the ij-subdichotomy -namely, where the DM additionally knows that θ ∈ {θ i , θ j }. This yields updated prior beliefs q h /(q i + q j ) on state θ h = θ i , θ j , but still any action a k can be taken. Let V * ij be the full information payoff of the ij-dichotomy. In Appendix 7.3, we prove the central result:
Theorem 4 Assume a unique argmax ij = 12 of ρ ij . Then there existsρ E < 1 such that, for all payoffs u and nondegenerate prior beliefs q:
To wit, the FIG tends exponentially fast to the total chance q 1 + q 2 of states {θ 1 , θ 2 }, times the FIG for that subdichotomy. Intuitively, for all initial beliefs and payoffs, the problem reduces at n large to the inference sub-problem between the pair of states hardest to distinguish. A worst-case or 'minimax' inference rule thus arises endogenously as the asymptotically optimal one in a multi-state Bayesian problem.
Theorem 4 allows us to extend our theorems to K actions and M states. T81's Theorem 4.2 also leads to a minimax conclusion, but yields a ranking only for value levels. Unlike our many state extension, the proof in T81 critically depends on 0-1 losses.
Theorem 1 is valid with index ρ E = ρ 12 and constant c M K = (q 1 +q 2 )c 2K . For by §5.A,
Conclusion
This paper offers contributions to classical questions about information. We work in the standard framework with a single opportunity to buy information, and have assumed that information units are cheap relative to payoffs, and can be purchased in large iid samples.
We have first ordered the value of information, by ranking almost all signals for their value in large samples. We then extended this ordering to the marginal value of information. Here the distinction between the statistical and economic approaches is most evident: The marginal value of information vanished as 1/n in the statistical deficiency sense (Mammen, 1986) , but exponentially in our economic sense. We then derived a new logarithmic asymptotic formula describing the large demand for information, and provided an asymptotic error window of one unit -despite the unboundedness of demand. Finally, we have provided error bounds to underscore the validity of our results as approximations away from the limit. Our conclusions are simple and readily amenable to applications.
7 Appendix: Deferred Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
For ease in comparison with §5 of Bahadur and Rao (1960) [BR60], our proof is for the flip ≥ inequalities and for the opposite case of a process
The cdf's Φ n converge to the Gaussian cdf Φ, by the CLT. Under our assumptions, Y has a finite fourth moment. Hence by equation XVI.4.15 in Feller (1968) (with r = 4), we may write the Edgeworth expansion
Here, R 3 (x), R 4 (x) are polynomials depending only on the first four moments of Y . So
/n for linear combinations P 3 , P 4 of Hermite polynomials.
For future reference, notice thatη n ≡ sup x∈ |η n (x)| = O(1/ √ n) uniformly in x, because the Gaussian density Φ (x) swamps the polynomials, and since (7) holds uniformly in x.
Using the error function expansion 1 − Φ(y) = (2π) −1/2 e −y 2 /2 y −1 {1 + O(y −2 )}, valid for y large (see (54) in BR60), and γξ(q, u)/σ = |τ | ξ(q, u) by definition of γ, we then have
For the other term W n [η n + o(1/n)], fix ε > 0 and choose n large enough that |o(1/n)| < ε/n for all x, including ξ n . Therefore, o(1/n) − o(1/n) < 2ε/n, and so
Hence, multiplying by ρ n , we find as claimed:
Omitted Parts of Proof of Theorem 3
Claim 1 If D(p) = arg max n∈N V (n)−np, and n(p) = inf D(p), then lim p→0 n(p) = ∞.
Proof: First note that the demand correspondence is decreasing at all n. Indeed, V (n)
is monotone in its ordered argument n (marginal value is positive), and so is quasisupermodular. Hence, V (n) − np satisfies a single-crossing property (SCP) in (n, −p), and thus the set D(p) of maximizers n(p) is nondecreasing in −p, i.e. nonincreasing in p.
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In particular, inf D(p) and sup D(p) are monotonic. So the infimum n(p) has a limit, say B. If B < ∞, then n(p) ≤ B < ∞ for all p. Since V (n) is strictly increasing in n, we may choosen, such that ε ≡ V (n) − V (B) > 0. Since n(p) +n ≥n and
Claim 2 For almost all p, D(p) is single-valued.
Proof: Maximizing a function V (n) − np over integers yields multiple solutions n , n only if V (n ) − n p = V (n ) − n p. For each pair n , n , a unique such p is implied. This set is clearly countable.
12 See Theorem 2.8.6 in Topkis (1998) . We thank a referee for drawing our attention to this implication.
Proof of Theorem 4
Recall that we have M states and K actions, with action a i strictly best in state θ i . Let h i = arg max =i ρ i , so that θ h i is the state hardest to disentangle asymptotically from θ i . Then h h i = i by symmetry of the Hellinger transform, while ρ E ≡ ρ 12 is the unique maximand across ρ i . Also, for h = 1, 2, . . . , M , let
denote the likelihood ratio (LR) of the n observations X n in state θ h versus state θ i = θ h .
Claim 3 For every ε > 0 and
Proof: If all b h ≤ 0 for all h = i, we're done, since Z hi (n) is positive (being a LR), so the chance in the claim is zero. Assume some
in state θ i , and the chance it exceeds a positive threshold vanishes at rate ρ
Lemma 1, and because the rate is (weakly) slowest for h = h i , by definition of h i .
We next show that the chance of taking any action a j = a i in state θ i vanishes no slower than ρ n ih i / √ n. So when i = 1, 2, this chance is eventually the same as when only states θ 1 and θ 2 exist, that sub-inference problem being the most resilient to Large Numbers. To this end, for i = 1, 2, let ρ ik i = max h =1,2 ρ ih denote the largest pairwise index between state θ i and states θ h , h > 2, by assumption strictly less than ρ E ≡ ρ 21 = max h =i ρ ih . That is, max ρ 1k 1 , ρ 2k 1 , max >2 ρ h < ρ E . Next, let α ji denote the chance of taking action a j in state θ i = θ j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , K -hence a chance of error in the larger (M, K)
problem. Finally, consider a sub-decision problem -a double sub-dichotomy -with the prior focused only on states θ k and θ i , with chances (q k , q i )/(q i + q k ), and where only actions a j and a i are admissible. In this problem, let α (ki) ji be the chance that action a j yields higher expected utility than action a i .
Claim 4 For all j = i:
Denote by E jk = E jk (X n ) the event that action a j yields a higher expected utility than a k after observing X n in the M -state, K-action problem. That is,
So the chance α ji of taking action a j in state θ i cannot exceed the chance that action a j beats a i , the best action in that state: Namely, α ji = Pr(∩ k =j E jk |θ i ) ≤ Pr(E ji |θ i ). Then
which we write as E ji ⊆ F j1 + Pr(G ε j1 |θ 1 ), since h 1 = 2. Applying Claim 3 to h > 2, and using ρ 1k 1 = max h>2 ρ 1h :
where the last equality owes to α Pr(x i |θ j ) = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. This signal is perfectly informative of the true state, except in states θ 1 and θ 2 : After the realization x 12 , the DM knows θ ∈ {θ 1 , θ 2 }, with chances q 1 /(q 1 +q 2 ) and q 2 /(q 1 +q 2 ); after any realization x j , for j > 2, the true state must be θ j . In the latter case, the DM takes action a j and earns u jj . Let the DM observe this signal first and then observe n independent draws of the original experiment. The ex ante unconditional chance of realizing x 12 is Σ i q i Pr(x 12 |θ i ) = q 1 Pr(x 12 |θ 1 ) + q 2 Pr(x 12 |θ 2 ) + Σ i>2 q i 0 = q 1 + q 2 . Let V 12 (n) denote the value of running the 12 dichotomy n times with prior q 1 /(q 1 +q 2 ). Observing the informative auxiliary signal cannot hurt the DM, so that V (n) ≤ (q 1 + q 1 )V 12 (n) + Σ j>2 q j u jj . The full information payoff of the 12 dichotomy is
